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I. Introduction 
Remedial problems are best dealt with in the context of 
substantive law situations. However, the disparate charac-
teristics of restitution, equitable remedies, and damages neces-
sitate some generalized preliminary comment. We regret that 
the points raised in the California cases during a one-year 
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period do not form a tidy or cohesive pattern or adapt them-
selves to a symmetrical outline. 
II. Restitution-Some General Principles 
To obtain restitution under the common law, an action of 
assumpsit was utilized where the relief sought was a money 
judgment for benefits received by the defendant. Customarily, 
the claim is characterized as "quasi-contractual"; it is well 
established that section 537 (1) of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure supports an attachment in conjunction with 
such a claim as an "action upon a contract, express or implied, 
for the direct payment of money." The principal reason for 
choosing quasi-contract in preference to an alternative tort 
claim, in the fairly well defined situation where it is allowed, 
is to take advantage of the attachment provisions. The logic 
of this position is apparent when consideration is given the 
case of Samuels v. Superior Court. 1 The petitioner (defendant 
in the main action) unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus 
to quash an attachment as to certain moneys held by him. 
The factual situation is obscure, the dispute apparently 
arising from dealings between the parties relative to an apart-
ment house, the plaintiff asserting a right thereto but the de-
fendant being in position to collect the rentals from the ten-
ants. The questioned attachment concerned the garnishment 
of certain of these rents (in the somewhat miniscule amount of 
$25 or $30) in conjunction with a complaint labeled, "Quiet 
Title to Real Property; Specific Performance of Contract; 
Damages for Breach of Contract; Rescission of Deed; Cancel-
lation of Deed; Fraud; Abuse of Process; Declaration of Con-
structive Trust", followed by some 11 causes of action, the last 
being for money had and received as to the rental. The appel-
late Court described this as "hodge-podge" and "messy" and 
earnestly suggested that no attempt be made to go to trial 
without cleaning things up at a pretrial conference. The im-
mediate point before the court, however, was the validity of the 
1. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
216 (1969). 
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attachment. Petitioner offered two arguments. The first 
was that an attachment is not authorized in an "equitable 
action not based on contract or quasi-contract." The Court 
had little difficulty in rejecting this contention. Equitable 
claims, even when commingled with assertions of tort, do not 
preclude a proper concomitant assertion of a quasi-contractual 
remedy allowing attachment. The claim as to rents was 
clearly one based on an "implied-in-law" contract within the 
terms of Code of Civil Procedure section 537 (1); the Court 
characterized it as one falling within those instances where 
a defendant, in possession of funds collected by him from 
a third person, is under a legal duty to account to plaintiff. 
While this commonly, as here, gives rise to an assumpsit count, 
it could also be justified as an example of an even more ancient 
common-law restitutionary action, that of "account." Or, 
if one wishes to stretch a bit, it may be recalled that mesne 
profits are recoverable in California by means of a common 
count separate from the tort action of ejectment or trespass. 
The petitioner's second objection to the garnishment of 
the rents has an odd sort of surface logic. He asserted, cor-
rectly, that a plaintiff cannot attach his own property. Thus, 
since plaintiffs claimed as the real owners in equity of the 
property, the rents were likewise claimed and could not be 
garnished. The appellate Court was sufficiently intrigued by 
this to request supplemental briefings, but neither counsel shed 
any light on the point by way of analysis or authority. Nor 
could the appellate Court find controlling authority in this con-
text. It solved the problem by invoking the general principle 
(citing authorities) that if the defendant's right to the fund 
garnished is such that he, as principal debtor, could have sued 
the garnishee in debt or assumpsit, then the garnishment of 
the fund is proper. Although this explanation seems to beg 
the question, the holding must be accepted as correct. The 
notion that a plaintiff cannot attach his own property has valid-
ity in terms of tangible property, but not money claims; other-
wise a defendant in an action for money had and received 
could quash any attachment by claiming that the fund attached 
was indeed the very money "received." At the same time it 
must be admitted that the holding results in another anomaly, 
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i.e., that in an action for money had and received for rents 
to which the plaintiff rather than defendant is entitled, the 
plaintiff may garnish the tenants and thus attach the rents 
before the defendant "receives" them. While justifiable in the 
abstract (and useful on occasion) the principle here estab-
lished was of such trifling relevance to the overall case, in-
volving primary ownership rights in extensive real estate, 
that insistence upon it here seems inappropriate. The overall 
dispute was plainly one of equitable jurisdiction, and the 
quasi-contract count is of vestigial significance. In such cir-
cumstances the appellate Court was quite correct in pointing 
out that a more appropriate ancillary remedy would be the 
appointment of a receiver of the rents pendente lite. The Court 
noted with asperity the "fruitless labor of counsel and unnec-
essary consumption of judicial time, at both the trial and 
appellate levels" which could have been avoided had plain-
tiff originally used the ancillary equitable receivership. 
The decision in Peterson Tractor Co. v. Orlando's Snack-
Mobile Corp.2 deserves a decided "caveat" in terms of resti-
tutionary principles. The individual defendants were officers, 
directors, and dominant shareholders in a pair of corpora-
tions, Litecrete Construction and Orlando's Snack-Mobile. 
To bolster Litecrete's credit rating, the defendants gave to 
Dun & Bradstreet, on behalf of Orlando's Snack-Mobile and 
themselves as individuals, a statement of continuing guaranty 
for Litecrete's obligations. The statement further authorized 
Dun & Bradstreet to rely on the guaranty in furnishing a credit 
rating. The plaintiff, before doing business with Litecrete, 
obtained a credit report from Dun & Bradstreet which dis-
closed the relationships between the· defendant and Litecrete, 
but did not mention the guaranty. In reliance upon the re-
port, the plaintiff extended credit to Litecrete. Litecrete be-
came defunct. Defendants, when sued in their capacity as 
guarantor, pointed out that since plaintiff did not know of 
the guaranty and had not been given written notice of ac-
ceptance, no basis for a contract action existed. Defendants 
2. 270 Cal. App.2d 787,76 Cal. Rptr. 
221 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 55 
5
York: Remedies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Remedies 
also suggested that the statute of frauds applied. The defend-
ants were quite correct in this position, but the trial and ap-
pellate Court (as well as the writer) inclined toward the plain-
tiff. Given the perimeters of the facts stated, the remedy 
would apparently lie in a routine application of the doctrine 
of "disregard of the corporate entity." In a situation of guar-
anty, the related theory of "alter ego" would readily dispose 
of the statute of frauds problem. The appellate Court, how-
ever, justified a finding in plaintiff's favor by citing, of all 
things, section 90 of the First Restatement of Contracts,3 
regarding promissory estoppel (not that there was either a 
"promisee" or "reliance," but because there was unjust en-
richment) ; hence, a quasi-contractual remedy was imposed by 
law. The implication that causes of action arising under 
section 90 are quasi-contractual, deriving from unjust enrich-
ment (or vice versa), is so aberrational to either the law of 
contracts or the doctrine of restitution that it might be best to 
ignore the opinion in Peterson Tractor, without quarreling 
with the outcome. 
III. Damages-General Comment on Punitive Damages 
Some minor facets of punitive damage awards were polished 
by two California cases in the past year. The fact that tort-
feasors are labeled "joint" does not mean that all will be 
liable for punitive damages assessed against one: so held 
the Court in Oakes v. McCarthy CO.,4 a land slippage case 
in which compensatory damages were assessed against the 
tract developer (for negligence) and the vendor (for fraud) 
as joint tortfeasors. Punitive damages, however, were entered 
against only the vendor. The same case repeated the familiar 
holding that the wealth of the tortfeasor is a factor in calculat-
ing exemplary damages in California. 
3. § 90 Promise Reasonably In-
ducing Definite and Substantial Action. 
A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance of a definite and substan-
tial character on the part of the 
56 
promisee and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if in· 
justice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise. 
4. 267 Cal. App.2d 231, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 127 (1968). 
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In Carter v. Agricultural Insurance CO.,5 it was held that 
the surety on the attachment undertaking required by section 
539 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not liable for punitive 
damages imposed upon the attachor for wrongful attachment. 
The decision rests upon statutory construction, though an in-
ference may be drawn from dicta that the Court was inclined 
(at least slightly) toward the line of cases holding that sure-
ties and liability insurers are not liable for punitive damages. 
IV. Equitable Remedies-
A. Enforcement of Decrees-Contempt 
The utility of the injunctive remedy must depend, in the 
long run, upon the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism 
of contempt unless the citizenry is conditioned to respond re-
flexively to judicial exhortation-a situation which seems in-
creasingly less likely. In simple form, the mandatory injunc-
tion is enforced by coercive imprisonment until performance 
is obtained. The more common negative or prohibitory de-
cree poses quite different problems. If the order involves the 
prohibition of a single irreversible act (the usual picturesque 
example of ringing a bell), any contempt proceeding is per-
force purely punitive in nature. If the prohibitive decree is 
directed against continuing conduct where repeated violations 
are possible, a contempt citation, while punitive as to past con-
duct, retains a measure of coercive, in terrorem overtones as to 
future violations. Finally, a decree prohibiting a single cor-
rectable act also has a dual aspect insofar as contempt process 
for violation is concerned; it is punitive in that fine or imprison-
ment may be imposed for the violation,6 and coercive to the 
extent that a mandatory order may be issued (in replacement 
of the negative decree) to take corrective measures, which 
order is in turn enforceable by purely coercive confinement. 
5. 266 Cal. App.2d 805, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 462 (1968). 
6. Outside of California it is com-
mon practice to award compensatory 
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In California, an attempt has been made to include all this 
and more in a single statutory procedure governing contempt 
citations. The most relevant sections are 1218 and 1219 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. The latter covers the coercive 
power to compel compliance with mandatory equity decrees 
by confinement, provided the contemnor has the present abil-
ity to comply. The former, section 1218, provides for limited 
fine or imprisonment and covers all other contempt situations. 
Although, as noted, fines or imprisonment may have an in-
direct coercive effect in deterring further violations, section 
1218 remains basically punitive. Whatever the original civil 
characteristics of the equitable contempt doctrines incorpo-
rated in these enactments, the California statutes have been 
repeatedly characterized as "quasi-criminal" in nature. The 
result of this characterization is that a vigorously literal com-
pliance is frequently exacted in this state, and technicalities 
(perhaps overtechnicalities) hinder fast and effective enforce-
ment of what, after all, are purely civil remedies. For ex-
ample, in California, a plaintiff who has been pecuniarily dam-
aged by the defendant's violation of an injunction must bring a 
separate action for such damages, because no provision for 
such is made in the statutory contempt sections.7 
The decision in Liu, In res displays a typically rigorous ad-
herence to the letter of the statutory contempt plan of Cali-
fornia. As a result of a separate maintenance action, child 
custody was awarded to the wife. On April 22, 1968, an 
order was issued restraining the husband from removing the 
child from Los Angeles without first obtaining a prior order 
of court or written consent of the wife. On November 7, 
1968, the husband removed the child from Los Angeles Coun-
ty. In December the wife filed a declaration and an order 
to show cause was issued; in early 1969, the husband was 
adjudged in contempt and ordered to be confined until he 
complied. In the cited decision the husband was released on 
a writ of habeas corpus. The defects found in the procedures 
7. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Superior 8. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
Court, 42 Ca1.2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 85 (1969). 
(1954). 
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followed by the lower court have a bearing on the practical 
effectiveness of civil contempt in California. 
First, the appellate Court noted that, unfortunately, the 
trial judge had elected not to punish the husband for past 
offenses (section 1218) but to imprison him to compel future 
compliance (section 1219). The declaration did not specific-
ally state that he had the present ability to comply (the trial 
court expressly said he did, however), and hence he was not 
adequately apprised that at the hearing he might be sentenced 
indefinitely. 
Second, the declaration did not allege a violation of the 
order of April 22, 1968, because it did not aver that the re-
moval of the child was without either a prior court order or 
the wife's written consent. Bearing in mind the implicitness 
of the lack of the order or consent, and that we are dealing 
with the welfare of children in a purely civil case, the rigid 
technicality of the California approach to civil contempt be-
comes markedly apparent. 
Third, although the contempt order itself stated that the 
husband had the present ability to comply, the appellate Court 
held to the contrary. The order was to not remove the child. 
The child was removed on the seventh of November. Said 
the Court: "There is no way in which the petitioner can now 
not remove the child on November seventh . . . . A bell 
cannot be unrung although a court orders it to be done." 
According to the appellate Court, the trial judge should have 
issued a new mandatory order for the child to be returned, 
and then repeated the whole section 1219 contempt routine. 
By way of comment (avoiding as much as possible the fog 
which always surrounds the use of double negatives), the 
Court's bell-ringing analogy is inapt. The child can be re-
turned. The point is whether essential matters can be sum-
marily disposed of in the contempt proceedings without being 
unfair to the contemnor. The Liu case says it can't be done 
and the controlling case (Dewey v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. 
64,22 P. 333 (1889)) says it can't be done. In Dewey, the 
defendant was enjoined from maintaining a dam or other 
obstruction to the flow of a creek. The defendant obstructed 
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the creek. In contempt proceedings the defendant was or-
dered confined until the obstructions were removed. The 
Supreme Court reversed the contempt order, holding that 
a second mandatory order to remove the dam would have to 
be made. 
The Dewey case, besides suggesting questions as to the 
mandatory order disguised in negative form, more directly 
raises practical issues. If a contemnor wilfully does an act 
in violation of a negative equity decree, which act can readily 
be undone, why should the plaintiff have to go back to the 
beginning and obtain a second mandatory order to get what 
he had in the first place? Why should there be a "quasi-
criminal" mystique about enforcing negative equity decrees 
in civil cases? Is it the lesson that trial courts should 
word decrees in the mandatory form wherever possible to 
expedite enforceability? The concurring opinion in Liu de-
murred on this point: 
I do not think it is necessary to hold that where a party 
has violated a prohibitory injunction and the contempt 
power is used coercively under section 1219 . . . to 
compel him to undo what he has done, it is essential 
that the court have first made a mandatory order to that 
effect . . . I rather suspect that [Dewey] is a product 
of an age in which mandatory injunctions were ill fa-
vored. It seems to me that if a court enjoins a defend-
ant not to dig a ditch and he does dig a ditch, justice 
does not require a second order that he fill up the ditch, 
before the court can order him to do so on pain of 
imprisonment until he does, provided, of course, he has 
the present ability.9 
Interestingly enough, the same appellate Court a few weeks 
later, in reviewing a contempt order for violation of a nega-
tive decree, did indeed separate the punitive (quasi-criminal) 
elements from the civil enforcement element, and approved a 
corrective measure embodied in the contempt order itself.lO 
9. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 10. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 
85 (1969). Rptr. 415, 424. 
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The opinion is but one of many in lengthy and vigorously 
contested litigation, the case having reached the appellate 
level several times. The facts must be drastically abridged. 
In 1962 land was sold by Alpine Palm Springs Sales, Inc. to 
Green Trees, Inc. on promissory notes secured by trust deeds. 
When Green Trees failed to make payment, Alpine began 
foreclosure. Before sale was had, Green Trees sued for fraud 
and in 1964 had judgment for compensatory damages (which 
took the form of halving the amount due on the notes), puni-
tive damages, and an injunction against foreclosing on the 
trust deeds for a certain period to allow Green Trees to make 
arrangements to payoff the balance. This negative decree 
(on which focus must be kept) was repeatedly extended and 
expired finally on November 4, 1966. On September 28, 1966 
the court of appeals reversed the judgment below. Alpine 
waited 30 days and on October 31, 1966, four days before 
the injunction expired, held a foreclosure sale, purchased the 
property, and received foreclosure deeds. Green Trees, how-
ever, appealed to the Supreme Court which, in 1967, reversed 
the court of appeal and affirmed the 1964 judgment in favor 
of Green Trees along with the extensions of the injunction 
against foreclosure. The effect of this action was to put Alpine 
in violation of the injunction and exposed to contempt pro-
ceedings, which Green Trees, with evident relish, pushed. 
The trial court found the Alpine group in wilful contempt 
and ordered it to revest the title acquired by foreclosure in 
Green Trees. In the event the order was not carried out 
within 30 days, the clerk of the court was empowered to act 
in Alpine's stead. This is the order reviewed on petition 
for writ of certiorari and prohibition by the court of appeal 
in the present case. Alpine raised numerous objections to 
the order, of which two need be noted here: 
a) that the adjudication of contempt was barred by the 
statute of limitations since the contumacious act 
had taken place two years before; 
b) that the order to retransfer title to the property ob-
tained through the foreclosure proceedings in viola-
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tion of the court because it was not a form of punish-
ment prescribed in either section 1218 or 1219. 
In reviewing the order and objections, the appellate Court 
looked to both the punitive and "curative" aspects of the pro-
ceedings in deciding whether the statute of limitations had 
run. ll Although the trial judge chose to impose no punish-
ment for violating the order, the appellate Court still found it 
essential to rule on the limitation issue, since conceivably the 
judge had in mind the imposition of punishment if the Alpine 
group failed to convey, so as to require a conveyance. On 
this issue the court said: 
We hold the statute has run against the punishment 
phase of the proceeding. We do not feel however that 
any statute of limitations has run against the judicial step 
of curing the continuously operating effect of the con-
temptuous act. 12 
As to the second point, whether the order embodied meas-
ures not authorized under sections 1218 or 1219, the Court 
said: 
We conclude that where a court has issued a 
prohibitory injunction and it has been violated and the 
effect of the violation can be cured by a further direction 
to the contemnor to perform that curative act, such an 
order can validly be made . this [remedy] can 
properly be applied to a real property title situation.13 
By way of final comment on this decision, it is submitted 
that a welcome step has been taken in separating the purely 
punitive aspects of the California statutory contempt scheme 
from the aspects concerned with effectuating civil equity de-
crees. However, the curative measures taken here to rectify 
the result of the violation of the negative decree can be accom-
plished without the ultimate threat of imprisonment under 
11. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 13. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
415,425. 415,425. 
12. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
415,424. 
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section 1219. If the curative measures necessary were such 
as required in Liu-i.e., the entry of a new mandatory order 
enforceable only by threat of imprisonment-the question 
still remains as to whether the "quasi-criminal" gloss which 
has been given to proceedings under that section would com-
pel the application of the one-year statute of limitations not 
only as to the actual confinement for contempt but even to 
the entry of the substitute mandatory "corrective" order it-
self. 
B. Legal EfJect of Equitable Decrees 
The question of whether an equity decree has direct effect 
on legal title was raised in the Alpine opinion. The Alpine 
group acquired legal title through deeds issued as the result 
of foreclosure proceedings, which Alpine was, at the time, 
enjoined from instituting. The Supreme Court held the sale 
invalid. Does this automatically revest title in Green Trees? 
If so, contempt proceedings would be unnecessary, and if 
Green Trees desired further adjudication it would take the 
form of a quiet title suit. Without denying this possibility, 
the court stated, ". [W]e are not convinced that this 
is a practical solution and would have the clarity and strength 
in the chain of title as would a retransfer deed executed by 
Alpine Estates or by the clerk acting for the superior court. "14 
This expression is in conformity with the traditional equity 
approach that its decrees normally operated only in person-
am.15 
C. Comments on the "Clean Hands" Maxim 
The California courts properly continue to avoid a reflexive 
application of the "clean hands" doctrine in equity causes, 
14. 66 CaJ.2d 782, 59 Cal. Rptr. 141, 
427 P.2d 805 (1967). 
15. In the 1967 edition of this pub-
lication the remark was made: "A 
rather unusual combination of reme-
dies for deceit was sanctioned by the 
Supreme Court in Green Trees Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine 
Estates." York, REMEDIES, Cal Law-
CAL. L.AW 1970 
Trends and Developments 1967, p. 283, 
at p. 299. The remark was directed 
to the additional injunctive feature of 
the judgment. In the light of the 
prolonged and complex record in the 
litigation, there may be a warning 
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where litigants who are with personal fault abound. Two 
cases within the past year involve attempts to recover prop-
erty transferred by the plaintiff with intent to place it beyond 
the reach of creditors. In Samuelson v. Ingraham16 the maxim 
was invoked to bar a constructive trust, claimed with regard 
to realty transferred on oral trust, with the admitted intent 
to defraud creditors. That no creditors were complaining 
was held immaterial, since intent was the gravamen rather 
than accomplishment. A different result was obtained in 
H ill v. Younkin. 17 Here the plaintiff (Hill) conveyed title 
to separately owned property worth $89,000 to his daughter 
because he was "scared of lawsuits." The potential lawsuit 
arose from an automobile accident that was settled for $600, 
partially on the belief that Hill had no assets or insurance. 
In making the transfer, Hill was advised by counsel of the 
danger that his daughter might refuse to reconvey, but he 
insisted on the conveyance. He should have listened to coun-
sel. The daughter did refuse to reconvey, although Hill lived 
on the property and paid taxes until his daughter's death. The 
daughter had named her mother (the divorced wife of Hill) 
as sole legatee and devisee and the plaintiff brought a quiet 
title action. The Court concluded that the trial judge was 
correct under the circumstances in refusing to apply the 
"clean hands" doctrine, noting that while "intent" is a prime 
factor, the equity court must nevertheless consider all the facts. 
The disparity between the value of the property and the settled 
claim was duly noted; moreover, the claimant was found not 
to have been actually defrauded, considering the moderate 
nature of the injuries, the availability of counsel, and even the 
suggestion of contributory negligence. Furthermore, the 
claimant made no later attempt to rescind the settlement. 
Had the grantee (daughter) not flatly refused to reconvey 
prior to her death, the decision of the trial judge in plaintiff's 
favor would have been much easier. The appellate Court, 
in affirming, sanctioned a liberal exercise of discretion on the 
part of the trial judge in applying or refusing to apply the 
16. 272 Cal. App.2d -, 77 Cal. 17. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 750 (1969). Rptr. 509 (1969). 
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maxim. The degree of discretion allowed suggests that "clean 
hands" may be used two ways-as predominately a "defense," 
or as predominantly a measure to protect the court itself from 
affront. Which emphasis will be favored in California in any 
given case is not predictable. For example, one line of cases 
tends to conceptualize the clean hands doctrine as a "defense" 
in the sense that it must be raised in the trial court to be 
available; these holdings are referred to in Behm v. Fireside 
Thrift Co. lS The notion of "unclean hands" as a "defense" 
reached its culmination in the case of Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists/9 and leads 
promptly to the error (as it did in Fibreboard) of suggesting 
that the doctrine is applicable to law actions, presumably in 
derivation from the idea that equitable "defenses" are avail-
able in law actions. This confuses the inequitable with the 
illegal. On the other side, the Behm case also notes a par-
tially offsetting line of cases in which the doctrine has been 
applied sua sponte by a trial court where the defendant's con-
duct has been "flagrantly unconscionable." In addition to 
holding that the questioned conduct in Behm was not "fla-
grantly unconscienable," the Court gave what is perhaps a 
more sound reason for declining to apply the doctrine in this 
particular litigation, stating that the plaintiff was seeking to 
bar the defendant from asserting a legal defense of mutual 
mistake. 
In Delfino v. Delfino,20 the Court distinguished "unclean 
hands" from "unclean testimony" and declined to apply the 
doctrine against a wife seeking to set aside a decree of annul-
ment. Her supporting affidavits disclosed that she had com-
mitted adultery, but the Court went on to note that the other 
man had been secretly paid by the husband. To prevent the 
proof of unpleasant facts created by the inequitable conduct 
of the other party is not the function of the doctrine. 
18. 272 Cal. App.2d 15, 76 Cal. 20. 272 Cal. App.2d 556, 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 849 (1969). Rptr. 526 (1969). 
19. 227 Cal. App.2d 675, 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 64 (1964). 
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V. Remedies for Protection of Real Property Interests 
Plaintiff turned to equitable remedies to obtain a declara-
tion of an easement of right-of-way over a portion of defend-
ant's land in Miller v. Johnston. 1 The difficulties between 
these neighboring parties arose over plaintiff's restricted 
means of access in difficult terrain. Over the course of several 
years, plaintiff's problem in getting home became even more 
complicated by reason of the loss of certain rights and privi-
leges vis-a-vis the defendant. At the time of suit, access was 
nearly impossible unless plaintiff could use a small triangular 
area of defendant's property for turning purposes. The 
technique here used to afford equitable relief is of interest 
inasmuch as the result was placed solely and squarely on the 
relative hardship doctrine, the application of which was 
facilitated by defendant's request for a counter-injunction 
against plaintiff's continued trespasses. The Court's analogy 
was to encroachment cases in California, reasoning that the 
transitory passage of vehicles over another's land is different 
only in degree from a driveway which "encroaches" upon the 
land twenty-four hours a day. In thus creating an equitable 
easement by necessity as it were, the court required plaintiff 
to pay the maintenance expenses of the strip. A further 
judgment for $200 in damages in favor of defendant was indi-
cated. The Court, naturally, denied that its action amounted 
to unconstitutional private condemnation. 
VI. Remedies for Protection of Literary Property 
William v. Weisser2 represents an excellent discussion (par-
ticularly so to any academician) establishing a common-law 
copyright of a professor in his lectures. Defendant hired in-
dividuals to attend university classes and take lecture notes, 
which were then published under defendant's copyright. The 
remedies were an injunction, compensatory damages of 
$1,000, and punitive damages of $500. An accounting for 
1. 270 Cal. App.2d 289, 75 Cal. 2. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 699 (1969). 542 (1969). 
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defendant's profits would seem possible under the circum-
stances, but apparently was not pursued. 
VII. Malicious Prosecution-Consequential Damages 
An unusual case of malicious prosecution led to an unusual 
award of special damages in MacDonald v. Joslyn. 3 The 
malicious "prosecution" was a pre-probate will contest, and 
the "victim" was the executor of the will of Marcellus L. 
Joslyn. In the course of the will contest, the plaintiff, who 
had supervised the estate plan, had been charged, unjustly 
it was found, with undue influence, fraud, and conspiracy 
and "gratuitously" subjected to a demand for punitive dam-
ages. The publicity in the newspapers from these charges 
allegedly affected the plaintiff both socially and in his busi-
ness relationships. His bank called a loan for $100,000; he 
lost business positions; his health suffered. General dam-
ages of $10,000 for injury to reputation and for mental an-
guish were found by the trial court. 
Special damages of $123,052.91 were also found. As the 
result of the pre-probate contest, the public administrator was 
designated as special administrator of the Joslyn estate. He 
received ordinary and extraordinary commissions that the 
plaintiff would have otherwise received. Plaintiff also lost 
fees as testamentary trustee of certain trusts under the will, 
interim trustees having been appointed. 
In addition, $50,000 punitive damages (as to which the 
wealth of the defendant was considered) were found. The 
appellate Court affirmed all elements of damage, to the penny. 
VIII. Remedies for Personal Injuries-Damages. 
Excessive Awards and the Collateral Source Doctrine 
Excessive damage awards in personal injury cases continue 
to raise the problem of whether the solution is to be by re-
trial on the damage issue, usually conditioned on non accept-
3. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. this case, see Hill, TRUSTS AND 
707 (1969). For further discussion of ESTATES. in this volume. 
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ance of a remittitur, or by retrial on all issues because the size 
of the award suggests passion and prejudice infecting even 
the findings of basic liability. Gordon v. Strawther Enter-
prises, Inc. 4 is an example of the former; Collins v. Lucky 
Markets, Inc. 5 of the latter. 
A curious twist has been given to the remittitur question 
in a Supreme Court decision, Sabella v. Southern Pacific CO.,6 
because of trial tactics which have been employed to counter 
the application of the collateral source doctrine in personal 
injury cases. The doctrine operates, in the usual case, to ex-
clude evidence of reimbursement of the defendant through 
insurance, pensions, or other forms of disability compensation. 
The defendant frequently proffers evidence, particularly of 
disability pensions being drawn by the plaintiff, as relevant 
to an issue of plaintiff's motivation to indulge in malingering. 
The possible impact of this evidence on the jury's ultimate 
calculation of damages need not be pursued here. In any 
event, the decisions in California this past year deem the ad-
missibility of such evidence to be within the proper dis-
cretion of the trial judge (section 352 of the Evidence Code), 
the probative value being balanced against the potential preju-
dicial effect. In Sabella, a case arising under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, the trial judge excluded evidence of 
plaintiff's application for a disability pension, but thought 
better of it after the verdict.7 The solution adopted was to 
effect a remittitur, reducing the damages from $115,000 to 
$80,000, which plaintiff accepted. The railroad, which in 
this instance appears as a beneficiary of the holding, objected 
that remittitur is an improper device to remedy the error of 
exclusion of relevant evidence and argued that "having de-
4. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
417 (1969). 
5. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
454 (1969). 
6. 70 Ca1.2d 311, 74 Cal. Rptr. 534, 
449 P.2d 750 (1969). 
7. The reason for the judge's change 
of mind is understandable. In addi-
tion to the usual "probative" ground 
68 
regarding plaintiff's motives, there were 
two other bases for admissibility: (1) 
the plaintiff himself had introduced as 
evidence one part of his application 
for a disability pension, and (2) plain-
tiffs' counsel had in strong terms 
claimed the defendant had turned its 
back on the plaintiff, which assertion 
would be rebutted by the admission of 
the entire application. 
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prived defendant of a full hearing by the jury on all evidence," 
a new trial is necessary. The Supreme Court rejected this as 
"untenable" because the evidence was relevant to the damage 
issue alone-a conclusion consistent with legal concept, al-
though not, perhaps, with the folklore of certain trial lawyers. 
IX. Remedies for Deception 
A. Damages 
The basic out-of-pocket measure of damages for fraud in 
connection with the sale of property required by the Civil 
Codes has been considered unduly restrictive. There-
fore it was said in Hartong v. Partake, Inc., "the courts have 
tended toward a liberal computation of 'additional damages' 
. . . which include the reasonable value of time fruitlessly 
expended by a plaintiff in reliance on the representation of 
a defendant."g In Hartong, various plaintiffs were fraud-
ulently induced to acquire franchise distributorships. In the 
end they were saddled with the necessity of getting rid of mer-
chandise stocks by covering the routes and making additional 
sales. Compensation for the time spent in such attempts (ac-
tually pursuant to the duty to minimize) was affirmed by the 
appellate court. A point of minor interest here is that the four 
successful plaintiffs, all without experience in the particular 
franchise business, came from different backgrounds and had 
different skills. Thus their "additional damages" (although 
all plaintiffs did the same thing in consequence of the fraud) 
varied in accordance with their previously established hourly 
earning capacity. Hartong, a college student earning $3 per 
hour as a savings and loan officer, therefore sustained less 
"additional damage" than Botemiller, a driver for Union Oil, 
at $3.40 per hour. 
B. Trmacing-Constructive Trust 
If money obtained by fraud is used to acquire title to prop-
erty or is applied to improvements thereon (subject, of course, 
8. C.C. § 3343. 
CAL LAW 1970 
9. 266 Cal. App.2d 942, 966, 72 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Remedies 
to the evidentiary requirements of tracing), the equitable 
remedies of a constructive trust on, or lien against, the prop-
erty may be had. These remedies are commonly invoked 
when the money is traced to property otherwise exempt from 
levy and execution on ordinary money judgments. The case 
of Schoenfeld v. Norberg10 indicates that the principle will 
not be overextended. Schoenfeld defrauded Norberg of over 
$13,000 in 1956; of this amount, $274.42 was traced to home-
stead property and was repaid to Norberg before judgment, 
ultimately entered in an amount exceeding $19,000. In 1965 
Norberg caused a writ of execution to be issued and levied 
on the homestead. Norberg's position was that if any ill-
gotten moneys are traced to a homestead, the property 
loses its exempt character and becomes subject to any judg-
ment. The court disagreed and affirmed an injunction against 
the sale of the property by the sheriff. It reasoned that, be-
cause the small sum traced was repaid before judgment, the 
homestead stood as one obtained and declared in a lawful 
manner, in which no tainted money appears. On the facts, 
this appears to be an equitable result, but the decision raises 
a troublesome question of whether, for instance, an embezzler 
can protect exempt property by making partial restitution and 
electing to apply it to the satisfaction of that portion of the 
misappropriated money which has been traced, rather than 
to that which has not. 
C. Rescission Plus Punitive Damages 
Two casesll in California in 1968-69 confirm the trend 
toward a firm rule that an election to disaffirm a contract and 
seek restitution on grounds of fraud does not preclude a claim 
for punitive damages. The 1967 edition of this publication 
noted some previous uncertainty on the point. 12 
10. 267 Cal. App.2d 496, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 924 (1968). 
11. Mahon v. Berg, 267 Cal. App. 
2d 588, 73 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968). 
Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors, 
270 Cal. App.2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
70 
871 (1969). F or further discussion of 
the latter case, see Moreau, TORTS, in 
this volume. 
12. York, REMEDIES, Cal La\\,-
Trends and Developments 1967, p. 283 
at pp. 300-301. 
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x. Rescission-Discharge for Value as a Defense to Restitu-
tion from a Broker 
Attorneys for the purchasers of realty should be alerted 
to a provision that may appear in escrow instructions relating 
to broker's commissions. In Holmes v. Steele/3 a contract 
to purchase a tavern business was entered into, an escrow was 
opened and cash deposits made. Although not requested by 
either the buyer or the seller, the following appeared in the 
escrow instructions: 
It is expressly agreed and understood that the seller is 
presently obligated to pay to Jack Steele & Associates a 
brokerage commission of the sum of $2,000.00 for serv-
ices rendered and completed. Seller and buyer author-
ize and instruct said broker to retain and apply from 
buyer's deposit of $3,000.00 the sum of $2,000.00 as 
payment in full of seller's obligation. Seller shall credit 
buyer on account of the purchase price for said payment 
on his behalf.14 
The sum of $2,000.00 was paid to Steele outside of escrow, 
and thereafter the buyer rescinded the transaction because 
of misrepresentations made by the seller that constituted 
a breach of warranty. The action was against the broker, 
Steele, for restitution of the $2,000.00. The majority of the 
Court held that the defense of discharge for value would be 
available depending on the further determination of certain 
facts by the trial court. (A concurring and dissenting opinion 
favored the broker on agency rather than restitutionary prin-
ciples.) The Court quoted a Comment from section 17 of the 
Restatement of Restitution, 
. if the creditor beneficiary has an existing right 
against the third person and receives the property in 
discharge of the duty of the third person, the rule stated 
in § 14 is applicable. As there stated, he is protected 
against rescission of the transaction unless, at the time 
of receiving the property, he had notice of a defect in 
13. 269 Cal. App.2d 675, 75 Cal. 14. 269 Cal. App.2d 675, 676, 75 
Rptr. 216 (1969). Cal. Rptr 216, 217. 
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the original contract which would permit rescission as 
against the promisee. 
Thus, unless the broker is shown to have knowledge of the 
breach of warranty as would allow rescission against the 
seller, the buyer here, as a result of the escrow provision, is 
left with a presumably unsatisfactory remedy against the 
seller in tort or restitution. 
XI. Remedies for Mistake 
Where a mistake has occurred in a bargaining transaction, 
usually the mistake is raised as an affirmative defense to an 
action for specific performance, or the mistake is used as a 
basis for rescission and restitution. An exposition of some of 
the California law in this area is contained in Lawrence v. 
Shutt,15 where specific performance was sought by plaintiff, 
and defendant counter-claimed for rescission. The Court 
avoided the rescission of a land sale, but decreed an equitable 
adjustment of the rights of the parties. The ultimate result 
seems both fair and reasonable, although the rationale may 
not satisfy purists. 
The case arose out of the sale of 1280 acres of land to 
developers, the balance of the purchase price being secured 
by deeds of trust. There is no question as to the adequacy of 
consideration at the time of the making of the contract. The 
dispute centers about the "release" clause in the escrow in-
structions and deed of trust. As is not uncommon in this 
type of land development, the land is released from the deed 
of trust in parcels as payments are made. As development 
proceeds, the resultant income enables the developers to ob-
tain the release of other parcels. Here the topography of 
the land in question varied, some being well suited for de-
velopment, the remainder being rough and uneven. To avoid 
piecemeal selection by the developers, the clause provided for 
the release, upon specified payments, of lands in parcels "next 
contiguous" to those already freed. The sellers' understand-
15. 269 Cal. App.2d 749, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 533 (1969). 
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ing was that following the release of an initial 80-acre tract, 
rectangular parcels of 40 acres would be released, "each pro-
ceeding from one boundary of the property parallel to adjacent 
boundaries towards the center." The developers' interpreta-
tion, upon which they were acting, was stated in open court: 
"the word 'contiguous'. . gave them [the developers] 
the unrestricted 'right to select for release a piece of property 
that merely touches' and hence they could take that portion 
of the property suitable for development and leave the [sellers] 
with hills and gullies.,,16 Under this interpretation the sellers 
could well visualize an ultimate denouement of a development 
winding through the prime areas of the whole tract, with a 
substantial portion of the unpaid purchase price secured only 
by worthless land. It is important to note that the sellers be-
gan expressing dissatisfaction with the release clause before 
the close of escrow, and, through counsel, intimated that it 
was unenforceable. They did not, however, object to the 
closing of the escrow, and sometime after the close, when it 
became apparent what ta~k would be taken by the developers, 
they did serve a notice of rescission for mistake (and other 
grounds later abandoned). In the meantime, the sellers 
physically interfered with the developers to the point that one 
of the sellers was jailed for contempt in violating an injunc-
tive decree. 
When the case reached the litigation stage, it had this 
posture: the developers were seeking specific performance 
(particularly of the release clause), declaratory relief, and 
to quiet title; the sellers counterclaimed for rescission. The 
trial court decreed rescission. On appeal, the first issue 
considered, however, was the existence of a defense to specific 
performance of the release clause. The conclusion was that 
the clause was unenforceable because of uncertainty and un-
reasonableness, with the qualification that there was no re-
quirement that the entire contract be invalidated. This alone 
would necessitate reversal. 
At this point, it might appear that everything had been 
16. 269 Cal. App.2d 749, 762, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 533, 540. 
CAL LAW 1970 73 
23
York: Remedies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Remedies 
decided that needed to be decided, since the developers could 
have accepted the equitable qualification, inconvenient as it 
might have been to the future financing of their project, or 
else acquiesce in the proffered rescission. (Actually, the de-
velopers proved content with the declaration of unenforce-
ability of the clause.) However, the Court, for some unspoken 
reason, proceeded to deal with the counterclaim for rescission 
in detail. The somewhat puzzling aspect is that the same 
release clause held unenforceable for uncertainty was next 
reexamined in terms of "mistake." As has been said, any 
further analysis seemed unnecessary, but if there is a compul-
sion to do so within the "mistake" concept, it at least could 
be short; there was simply no ground for rescission since 
there was no mistake as to any fact constituting the basis of 
the bargain. At most there was a misunderstanding as to 
the meaning of words embodied in a nonintegral part of the 
contract, which had already been remedied by excision on 
terms favorable to the sellers and acceptable to the buyers. 
Misunderstandings raise problems as to contract creation, 
but not as to rescission. There was never any suggestion that 
there was not a contract here, in either a subjective or ob-
jective sense. In all fairness, there is a passage in the opinion 
to the effect that contractual obligations will not be set aside 
merely because of unilateral misunderstandings, but the main 
thrust of the opinion is clear. It runs as follows: sellers were 
unilaterally mistaken; California law allows rescission for 
unilateral mistake; section 1577 of the Civil Code, however, 
limits relief to those mistakes not caused by a neglect of a 
legal duty. The sellers, having expressed dissatisfaction with 
the release clause (the focal point of the "mistake") before 
close of escrow but then failing to raise their objection at 
escrow, being thus on inquiry as to the meaning of the word 
"contiguous," neglected their legal duty. Besides, rescission 
for unilateral mistake will not be allowed where it would im-
pose substantial hardship on the other party. Since the writer 
has expressed the opinion that this exposition is unnecessary 
to the correct result, no further comment will be made except 
to express the hope that resolution of problems of "misunder-
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standings" or lack of communication or uncertainty will not 
enter into the "mistake" area, which is boggy enough. 
From Gibbons v. Travelers Ins. Co./7 we learn that "ex-
trinsic mistake," when applied to a court judgment, means 
something different from "extrinsic mistake" in making a con-
tract in California. Here a personal injury settlement was 
effected on the basis of a skull fracture, with apparent com-
plete recovery. Later a permanent impairment of hearing 
developed. Such personal injury settlements and releases are 
often the subject of litigation aimed at rescinding them be-
cause of a mistake of fact (different injury) going to the basis 
on which the settlement was made, that is, mistake as to an 
"extrinsic fact." 
Such a contention was advanced in Gibbons and for present 
purposes may be assumed to have had merit. However, in 
Gibbons the injured party was a minor and the settlement 
had court approval. Of course a mistake in a court judgment 
can also be set aside for an "extrinsic mistake," but such a 
mistake is one "which prevents the litigant from knowing he 
has a day in court . . . [it] is not concerned with the na-
ture or quality of the presentation which the litigant can make, 
so long as he is given an opportunity to make it." Moral: 
litigants make basic extrinsic mistakes; judges don't. 
XII. Remedies for Breach of Land Sale Contract 
A. Buyer in Default-Damages-General Principles 
Remedial problems concerning executory land sale con-
tracts in California are somewhat acute, considering our 
antideficiency statutes, and our distinctions between routine 
transactions through escrow and instalment contracts with 
retained title as security. In addition, there is a generalized 
antipathy toward enrichment even at the expense of wilful 
contract defaulters. 
Prior case law has established the right of the wilfully de-
17. 274 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr. 
438 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 75 
25
York: Remedies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Remedies 
faulting buyer to restitution in an affirmative action,I8 and 
has defined enrichment as the excess of the price advanced 
over damagesl9 as measured by the rule in Royer v. Carter. 20 
Applying these principles, the defaulting purchasers of a 
snack shop were denied restitution in Sweet v. ReUsl because 
there was no net enrichment. The "benefit of the bargain" 
damages alone exceeded the payments made. 
In Barton v. White Oak Realty, Inc.,2 the defaulting buyer 
sued to recover her deposit, the sellers cross complaining for 
damages. The purchase price was $199,500 and the broker's 
commission totaled $11,970. Benefit-of-bargain damages 
were $4,500.3 The trial court allowed the cross-complainants 
these damages plus the broker's commissions; thus, the simple 
question posed on appeal was whether benefit-of-bargain dam-
ages plus the broker's commission on the original sale can be 
recovered by the sellers. After a careful analysis, the re-
viewing Court held this not necessarily so. If the seller re-
covers his expectancy damages plus the expenses, including 
commissions, that he would have had to pay on the sale if 
consummated, he is prima facie placed in a better position 
by the buyer's default. Therefore, the Court points out, the 
Royer rule states that the additional expenses allowed the 
seller (in addition to the general expectancy damages) are 
those in connection with a hypothetical resale at market value 
at the time of breach. If the contract price and market value 
are the same (i.e., no recoverable expectancy damages), the 
expenses of the hypothetical resale would normally be the 
same as actually incurred in conjunction with the broken 
18. Freedman v. The Rector, Ward-
ens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 
et al. 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 
31 A.L.R.2d 1 (1951). 
19. Honey v. Henry's Franchise 
Leasing Corp. of America, 64 Cal.2d 
801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18, 415 P.2d 833 
(1966). 
20. 37 Cal.2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 
(1951). 
1. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
829 (1969). 
76 
2. 271 Cal. App.2d 579, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 587 (1969). For further discus-
sion of this case, see Bernhardt, REAL 
PROPERTY, in this volume. 
3. The sellers claimed $39,500 as 
the difference between the contract 
price and the market value at the time 
of breach. Justice Kaus, exercising his 
characteristic gift for the apt phrase, 
remarked, "the court found that the 
owners had not overreached themselves 
as much as they had thought." 
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contract. But if the actual market value is lower, presumably 
the recoverable expenses in connection with the hypothetical 
resale, particularly with respect to commissions, would also 
be lower. (And, of course, a prompt actual resale at actual 
market price might disclose additional recoverable expenses.) 
However, a buyer is to be credited with any savings of actual 
expense in connection with the broken contract. In Royer the 
seller saved $780 in commission expense that he would have 
had to pay if the sale had gone through. 
Applying these propositions to the present case, the buyer 
is liable (in addition to benefit-of-bargain damages) for ex-
penses, including commissions, on a hypothetical resale, offset 
by any savings in commissions by reason of the failure of the 
first sale to go through. Thus, the issue becomes not whether 
the seller gets the broker's commission for the first sale, but 
whether he can avoid their offset because he may not be liable 
for them. In this connection the seller argued that by bring-
ing an action for damages, liability is automatically incurred 
for the broker's commission on the broken contract; that if 
the seller recovers the benefit of the bargain, the broker should 
be paid. The court rejected this proposition by pointing out 
that this would be in direct conflict with Royer,4 where the 
seller also sued, but the court offset the $780 commission 
actually saved. To accept the seller's proposition would make 
that $780 saving illusory. Accordingly, the case was re-
manded for further findings as to (1) the expenses of a second 
hypothetical sale and (2) whether the brokers had actually 
earned the commission at the time of breach (in contrast to 
the assumption that the mere filing of this action entitled 
them to the commission, as urged above). In case the reader 
is wondering why there was such concern as to whether the 
broker earned the commission and whether the seller could 
recover it, it should be pointed out that the seller was also 
one of the brokers. 
4. The court also declined to be Co., Inc. 121 Cal. App. 193, 8 P.2d 
bound by any intimations to the con- 1058 (1932). 
trary in Lesser v. W. B. McGerry & 
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Again, Sutter v. Madrin,5 the defaulting buyer sued 
for restitution of deposits in escrow ($20,000), and again 
the question of offsets for damages incurred by the seller under 
Royer was presented, here, however, with certain amplifying 
interpretations of Royer in mind. These interpretations are 
contained in a 1964 case, Allen v. Enomoto,6 where the seller 
traded the property within the shortest possible time after 
the buyer's breach. There were no benefit-of-bargain damages, 
but the court quoted the qualifying language from Royer: 
"[A]dditional expenses [which] are the natural consequences 
of the breach. . may be recovered." In the circum-
stances of Allen, these were held to include fire insurance, 
mortgage interest, and property taxes during the interim 
period between breach and resale (a trade in this case), as 
well as certain costs connected with the resale (trade) such 
as refinancing the loan and obtaining title insurance on the 
property received in trade. 
In Sutter, there were no benefit-of-bargain damages, and, 
more importantly, there had been no resale. The trial court 
found "additional expenses" of operating and maintaining the 
property in excess of the buyer's deposit in escrow. The 
state of the record, with conflicting and vague findings and 
conclusions, was deemed such that a remand was necessary in 
any case. The concurring opinion should be read first, as 
it offers a novel observation about benefit-of-bargain dam-
ages as well as specific guides to the interpretation of Royer. 
First of all, according to the concurring opinion, it is wrong 
to conclude that a finding of fact that the market value of 
the property did not change during the period of escrow im-
parts no damage. A two-month delay in the right to receive 
the purchase price damages the vendor, and interest on the 
purchase price at the legal rate during this period of delay 
should be allowed as damage. The second element of damages 
is the seller's actual expenses incurred in performance-in this 
case broker commissions and legal fees incurred in connection 
with the abortive sale. (Note that this approach vanes 
5. 269 Cal. App.2d 161, 74 Cal. 6. 228 Cal. App.2d 798, 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 627 (1969). Rptr. 815 (1964). 
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from the calculation of expenses of a hypothetical second 
sale as analyzed in Barton v. White Oak Realty, supra.) Ex-
penses of operating and maintaining the property are not 
allowable, since they are offset by the value of its posses-
sion. 
The majority opinion was less concerned with the specifics 
than with the problems suggested by an application of the 
Allen language to the situation in the case at bar. Without 
adequate findings, a resolution of the issues presented was 
impossible, so judgment was reversed. Because the opinion 
states, better than any summary could, the doubts and un-
certainties about the 1969 state of the law of damages in 
favor of a seller upon a buyer's breach of a land sale contract, 
the following extensive quote is made for such illumination 
as the practicing lawyer may gain therefrom: 
To permit items of fire insurance, taxes, mortgage in-
terest and numerous other expenses implicit in the owner-
ship and possession of the property as such 'additional 
expenses' opens the door to many difficult questions. 
Does a seller have the right to hold indefinitely and sue 
for loss incurred on expenses as enumerated in Allen, as 
such expenses are incurred or paid or may such expenses 
be permitted to accumulate? For example, if the owner 
never resold and held the property at a loss, does a cause 
of action accrue at his election within the statute of lim-
itations and does he have more than one such action? 
Must the owner, in order to collect such items of dam-
age, sell within a reasonable period after the breach? 
To what extent, then, could the defau1ting vendee offset 
the value of the use of the subject property? What 
would be the effect of an interim increase or decrease 
in value over the market value on the date of the breach? 
Is a seller entitled to interest on the agreed purchase 
price, as suggested in the concurring opinion, for the 
period of an aborted escrow? Doesn't every seller im-
plicitly waive interest on every purchase price for the 
duration of every escrow unless explicitly otherwise pro-
CAL LAW 1970 79 
29
York: Remedies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Remedies 
vided? Does a defaulting vendee assume all the expenses 
and obligations of unprofitable ownership?7 
B. Damages v. Rescission v. Foreclosure of Vendor's 
Lien v. Suit To Quiet Title 
1. In General. All the cases in the foregoing subsection 
except ones were land sale transactions through the 
normal escrow process. Gantner v. Johnson,9 on the 
other hand, involved an instalment land sale contract, 
with title retained by the vendor. This, of course, is 
recognized in California as a form of security trans-
action subject to the anti deficiency statutes. Iil For 
purposes of discussion, only certain rounded-off dollar 
figures will be utilized, and the community property 
aspects of the case, along with some consequential 
damages and repair costs, will be ignored. Assume a 
contract price of $68,500. The buyer, over the course 
of years, has made payments on principal of $42,500, 
leaving a balance of $26,000. The property is now 
worth $38,000. The buyer defaults; the seller re-en-
ters. What are seller's remedies if he wants the prop-
erty?l1 
2. Foreclosure of Vendor's Lien. The seller may bid in 
the property at the current market if he desires to go 
through this procedure. 
3. Rescission. This obviously holds little appeal in a 
falling market, as it means here a restoration of the 
$42,500 received, less any consequential damage. 
4. Suit for Damages. A straightforward action for bene-
fit-of-bargain damages, with the usual contract rule 
7. 269 Cal. App.2d 161 at p. 170, 
74 Cal. Rptr. 627 at p. 633 (1969). 
8. Honey v. Henry's Franchise 
Leasing Corp., 64 Cal.2d SOl, 52 Cal. 
Rptr. IS, 415 P.2d S33 (1966). 
9. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 3S1 (1969). 
10. See Code of Civ. Proc. § 5S0(b). 
80 
11. Parenthetically, if the vendor 
wishes to be rid of the property, the 
attempted remedy of an action for the 
purchase price or for specific perform-
ance might well encounter the rule in 
Venable v. Harmon, 233 Cal. App.2d 
297, 43 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1965), that the 
antideficiency statute would operate as 
a bar. 
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limiting recovery of specials to those within the con-
templation of the parties, poses an anomaly. The 
vendor assumes the burden of proving damages. To 
the extent, as here, that the proof falls short of the 
sum received, he is merely establishing a credit that 
must be refunded. Should he perchance succeed in 
establishing benefit-of-bargain damages in excess of 
payments received, a judgment for such excess would 
apparently be contrary to the California antideficiency 
statutes. Of course the statement of facts excludes 
this as a practical, if not hypothetical, possibility. 
5. Do Nothing. In view of the foregoing, the tempta-
tion to avoid action has a measure of attraction, al-
though the hiatus may be an uneasy one. Suppose the 
buyer serves a written offer for a mutual rescission. 
Acceptance is unthinkable; a rejection, on the other 
hand, may be regretted if there is a sudden rise in land 
values, in which event the buyer may be encouraged 
to incur the imposition of damages as a condition of 
resuming performance. An opportune resale is in-
hibited by the outstanding contract, broken though 
it may be. At best, the vendor may expect some 
assertion of a restitutionary claim, but the situation 
is not exactly under his control. 
6. Suit to Quiet Title. This was the remedy chosen by 
the vendor in Gantner and will probably become the 
common remedy in California. The filing of such a 
suit naturally prompts the buyer to cross complain, 
alleging that a forfeiture of interests in the property 
would result in unjust enrichment. This puts the 
defendant in the posture of a wilfully defaulting ven-
dee seeking restitution. Applying the Honey rule, 
benefit-of-bargain damages (per Royer) are subtract-
ed from the sum paid on the purchase price, and the 
balance returned by way of restitution. This approach 
has the advantage of clearing title as well as resolving 
the ultimate restitution problem on conditions of con-
venience to the seller. Although this appears to be 
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but a disguised action for damages, there are doc-
trinal aspects which favor it. The vendor seeks to 
impose no personal judgment and therefore has no 
burden of proving damages (including any by-play 
as to what was in the contemplation of the parties); 
on the contrary, the burden is on the wilful defaulter 
to prove that the seller has sustained a net enrich-
ment. Proper restitution principles, in the case of a 
wilful defaulter, would not limit the detriment sus-
tained by the innocent party to rigid contract dam-· 
ages, but would include other injury proximately sus-
tained, whether foreseeable or not. (Maybe this is 
what Allen v. Enomoto, (supra) was trying to say.) 
Speaking of doctrinal aspects, an anomaly exists in the 
use of a quiet title suit in the situation under discussion. In 
theory, such a suit by the vendor seeks to cut off the buyer's 
equity. It is contract-terminating, and, as such, close to 
rescission. Should it actually be called that, it would be fatal 
to the seller's case. The decision in Gantner (following 
Honey) meets the problem head on: "A vendor does not elect 
to rescind by bringing a quiet title action or by going into 
possession of the property after default by the vendee." So 
be it, the vendor has not elected to terminate the contract. He 
certainly hasn't elected to affirm it either. What has he done? 
c. Contract for the Sale of an Interest in Land-Seller 
in Default-Specific Performance v. Damages 
Brandolino v. Lindsai2 presents one of the classic dilemmas 
of the law-equity dichotomy. Implicit in the application of 
the benefit-of-bargain rule of damages at law is a statement 
that one party quite discernibly got the worst of the deal. 
The standard equity rule has been that hardship or inadequacy 
of consideration (absent fraud, mistake, undue influence, etc.) 
constitute defenses to the equitable remedy of specific perform-
ance but are not grounds for rescission of the contract; it is 
12. 269 Cal. App.2d 319, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 56 (1969). 
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thus permissible to dismiss the specific performance action, 
and with a residue of good conscience, leave the plaintiff to 
pursue his legal remedy. The procedural merger of law and 
equity sharpens the dichotomy, since a court sitting as chan-
cellor may be called upon to deny specific performance as 
inequitable, only to be requested, as judge, to order payment 
of damages. In California, the equitable rule is strengthened 
by statute,13 rendering specific performance unenforceable 
against a party where consideration is not adequate or the 
contract is not, as to him, just and reasonable. Plaintiff must 
allege that the contract is fair and reasonable. (It may also 
be noted that in California the buyer must establish that the 
vendor's breach was in bad faith to get benefit-of-bargain dam-
ages.) 
In Baran v. Goldberg,14 specific performance was denied the 
buyers because the market value of $16,500 was markedly 
greater than the contract price of $11,000. In-lieu damages 
were refused because the complaint, seeking only specific 
performance, stated no facts (naturally) to sustain an award 
of damages. Other cases, relying on Baran, have summarily 
stated that if specific performance is denied because of in-
adequacy of consideration, damages cannot be awarded. A 
reasonable inference may be drawn from this that would lead 
a lawyer to counsel a vendee client (understandably elated 
about a "fantastic" deal) to be content with a damage action, 
rather than to hazard drafting a complaint for specific per-
formance, no matter how badly the client wanted the property. 
In close cases, with uncertain market values, it is probable 
that many California lawyers have been troubled about their 
advice to clients. 
Counsel for the vendees in Brandolino did not hesitate. 
According to the statement of facts, a land sale contract for 
$50,000 was signed. Three days later the seller canceled the 
escrow, saying he could "get twice as much." Plaintiffs then 
filed suit and recorded a notice of lis pendens. Two causes 
of action were stated in the verified complaint: 
13. Civ. Code § 3391(1), (I). 
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1) specific performance, alleging the agreed price of 
$50,000 and that this amount was the "fair and reasonable" 
value of the property. 
2) damages for breach "in the amount of $25,000 which is 
the difference between the agreed price, $50,000, of the prop-
erty, and the value, $75,000." (An allegation that the breach 
was in bad faith must be assumed.) 
The parties proceeded to trial. When the vendee's own 
witness testified that the property was worth over $80,000, the 
judge stated that specific performance would be denied. Plain-
tiff's counsel thereupon announced abandonment of that cause 
of action. Damages in the amount of $25,000 were then 
awarded. The seller's reaction to this award of damages, 
"in equity" as he called it, was predictably sharp. 
To permit them to falsify their own allegations to seek 
damages under the circumstances makes a mockery of 
equity' and that 'the greater the discrepancy in the sworn 
allegation as to value, the greater would be their reward 
of damages.' He asserts further that charging him with 
bad faith and loading him with heavy damages for refus-
ing to perform the unfair agreement while he was pre-
vented by the lis pendens notice from salvaging anything 
from the property rendered meaningless the equitable rule 
against enforcing performance of an unjust agreement.15 
The appellate Court, nonetheless, affirmed the judgment for 
damages, holding merely that a plaintiff in California is al-
lowed to pursue alternative remedies and plead inconsistent 
causes of action and also that the decision as to an election 
need not be forced until after the evidence is taken. While 
filing a lis pendens in conjunction with specific performance 
is proper, in a pure damage action it might be considered 
abuse of process. However, the Court went on to hold that 
the recording of the lis pendens does not here "preclude plain-
tiffs from recovering damages in the event specific performance 
could not be decreed." If any criticism of Brandolino is in 
15. 269 Cal. App.2d at 324, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. at 59 (1969). 
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order it is not that the plaintiff has pleaded inconsistent causes 
of action or remedies but that he may have come dangerously 
close to pleading "contradictory or antagonistic facts,"16 which 
is another matter. In any event, the decision, as long as it 
holds, allows more room for maneuver with regard to the 
vendee's remedial possibilities than has formerly been thought 
to be the case. 
XIII. Remedies for Breach of Contract 
A. Construction Contracts-Breach by Owner-Dam-
ages 
According to Stephan v. Maioof,17 the measure of damages 
for breach, by the owner, of a construction contract, is the 
lost profits even thought the contractor never began perform-
ance. The defendant in Stephan urged reduction of damages 
(1) by the amount of the value of the contractor's own 
services which it was claimed was part of cost of performance; 
and (2) by an amount equivalent to plaintiff's release from 
care, trouble, risk, and responsibility which would have at-
tended full performance. The appellate Court rejected the 
argument, properly noting that this application of the doctrine 
of avoidable consequences, while perhaps applicable to a 
breach of contract for personal services (where the employer 
has the exclusive right to plaintiff's work), is inapplicable to 
the present case. 
B. Employment Contracts-Breach by Employee-Spe-
cific Performance and Damages 
California Labor Code, section 2855, allowing enforcement 
of unique services contracts for a term not exceeding "seven 
years from the commencement of service under it," does not 
enlarge the remedial rights of an employer beyond the actual 
termination date of employment. Rick Barry was employed 
16. See, e.g., Beatty v. Pacific States 17. 274 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr. 
Savings & Loan Co., 4 Cal. App.2d 461 (1969). 
692, 695, 41 P.2d 378, 380 (1935). 
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by the San Francisco Warriors under a one-year professional 
basketball contract with a unilateral option for another year 
if the player failed to sign a renewal contract. At the end 
of the term, Barry failed to renew his contract with the War-
riors and signed with a rival team, the Oakland Oaks. He was 
enjoined from playing for the Oaks for the year during which 
the reserve clause operated in the Warriors' favor. He did not 
play out the option with the Warriors but sat out the season 
pursuant to the injunction. In Lemat Corp. v. Barry/8 the 
Warriors contended that under the Labor Code, an injunction 
for up to seven years should be granted. The trial court blew 
the whistle on this attempted double dribble. Although it 
found that the Warriors lost $356,000 in gate receipts by 
reason of Barry's absence (it would have been even greater 
had Barry actually played for the cross-bay rivals), it declined 
to award damages, while at the same time limiting the final 
injunction to the contract term. 
The appellate Court agreed as to the injunction. The Labor 
Code section was held to embody a limitation upon enforcing 
these contracts of adhesion, rather than permitting enforce-
ment beyond the termination of the contract period. On the 
issue of damages, the appellate opinion said that a detailed 
discussion was not required, because it was clear that the 
request for relief was in the alternative and that damages 
would be of significance only if the equitable relief (as limited) 
had been denied. Having disposed of the issue in the case at 
bar, the opinion proceeded to include some questionable dicta. 
Describing plaintiff's contention as "unique," the court, citing 
California cases, recited a general rule limiting a plaintiff to 
an injunction against future injuries and damages for past 
mJunes. Such a rule, however, overlooks the dual aspects 
of these Lumley-Wagner type cases. Whereas an injunction 
ordinarily precludes future damage, this is not so in the case 
here presented. Barry was enjoined (the negative aspect) 
from playing for Oakland for the final year of the contract. 
But the equity decree did not accomplish the affirmative aspect 
18. 275 Cal. App.2d -,80 Cal. Rptr. 
240 (1969). 
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of performance; Barry did not play for the Warriors. Such 
damage is not prevented by an injunction. The so-called gen-
eral rule does not apply. On the contrary, the more relevant 
maxim that equity will not do justice by halves, or the principle 
that equity having taken jurisdiction will proceed to give full 
relief, should be invoked to sanction both an injunction and 
damages. 
Commenting that "damages" in a situation of this kind 
are speculative and uncertain and practically impossible to 
ascertain, the appellate Court questioned, in passing, the evi-
dentiary and logical basis for the trial court's finding that 
the Warriors had incurred a gate loss of $356,000 by reason 
of Barry's absence. This argument is fast losing persuasive-
ness in the modern era of professional athletics and electronic 
entertainment. Speculation as to amount remains, but the fact 
of damage is apparent to everyone. Enormously remunerative 
contracts are negoti';lted in hard-nosed business sessions be-
tween lawyers and agents, the gate-draw potential of a high 
draft choice being a dominant factor. Patronizing solicitude 
for the businessman-athlete seems curiously out of place. 
Conceding the necessity of some "speculation," it seems that 
modern courts are lagging behind the times in failing to deal 
adequately and realistically with prime business considerations 
in what are, with increasing frequency, million-dollar trans-
actions. 
XIV. Contracts Normally Unenforceable by Reason of the 
Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Wills 
California courts continue a liberal use of the "estoppel" 
principle in negating the statutory requirements of a writing 
both as to contracts and wills, and in fashioning suitable reme-
dial devices to enforce oral agreements. In Di Salvo v. Bank 
of America/9 the reviewing Court reversed a judgment of dis-
missal and held that a constructive trust might properly be 
claimed as to one-half of the Smith estate, then in probate. 
19. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
838 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 87 
37
York: Remedies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Remedies 
According to the allegations, the women had trouble with the 
menfolk in decedent's family. The plaintiff here is Grand-
daughter Smith. Some years prior to the action Grandfather 
Smith had been living with another woman. A family ar-
rangement was made, represented by the oral agreement in 
question, whereby Grandmother Smith agreed to allow Grand-
father to dispose of the community property by will. Grand-
father agreed to see that his wife and granddaughter were 
taken care of. Father Smith was to receive the community 
property and he in turn agreed to care for his mother for life 
and leave one-half of whatever property he had at death 
to the plaintiff. Father Smith, however willed the property 
to his third wife, with only a contingent interest to the plain-
tiff. In holding that these allegations stated a cause of action 
sufficient to impose a constructive trust in plaintiff's favor, 
based on estoppel against the estate to assert the statute of 
frauds, the Court took particular care to caution the lower 
court on retrial to accept only clear and convincing evidence. 
Of interest here is that the grandmother, who, as promisee, 
gave up her community interests, is not a party to the suit; 
the estoppel runs in favor of the donee beneficiary, who gave 
up nothing. 
It is fairly obvious that the more expansive rationale of 
"estoppel to assert the statute of frauds" has largely sup-
planted the "part performance" doctrine to bring about the 
enforcement of oral land sale contracts in California. With-
out the restrictive requirement of the part performance doc-
trine-that buyer's change of position be unequivocally related 
to the contract or in pursuance of the contractual objectives 
-the estoppel approach offers much broader evidentiary pos-
sibilities of detrimental reliance or unjust enrichment, the 
prevention of which, of course, underlies both theories. In 
Carlson v. Richardson,20 buyer sued for specific performance 
of an oral contract for the sale of an acre of ocean-front prop-
erty. Unless the contract were enforced, he alleged, the 
seller would be unjustly enriched because the land had risen 
20. 267 Cal. App.2d 204, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 769 (1968). For further discus-
88 
sion of this case, see Rohwer, CON-
TRACTS, in this volume. 
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in value since the contract, and, in addition, he [the buyer] 
would suffer detriment from the loss of the bargain and from 
"lost opportunities" to purchase the land. Buyer also averred 
detrimental reliance based upon his purchase of adjacent 
property for use as a temporary residence while he built on 
the property in dispute. None of these averments, it will be 
observed, would support a part performance theory. The tria] 
court sustained a demurrer, which was reversed on appeal. 
The reviewing Court held that while the assertion of "lost op-
portunities" cannot support a claim of reliance in detriment, 
nor can the fact of rising land values sustain a claim of unjust 
enrichment, the allegation of purchase of the neighboring 
property for temporary residence states a cause of action. 
Since the decision merely overrules a demurrer, too much 
should not be made of it. However, the cases in which "es-
toppel" has been invoked have in the main been those where 
the plaintiff has given up lucrative work and moved. Such 
forms of detrimental reliance are hard to remedy without 
enforcing the contract. Here the facts pleaded disclosed the 
detriment to be a failure to purchase property in an area of 
rising land values-not inevitably an irreversible detriment. 
Perhaps the message from this liberal handling of estoppel 
in California is that out West we consider that a man's word 
ought to be as good as his bond. 
xv. Illegal Contracts-Equitable Remedies 
Although courts nominally will afford no remedy, either 
by way of enforcement or restitution, to partieS to an illegal 
transaction (absent certain well-established exceptions), Cali-
fornia courts in recent years have avoided summary disposition 
of these cases in favor of equitable adjustment which avoid 
outrageous unjust enrichment and without, as a practical 
matter, condoning or encouraging illegal bargains. 
In Griffis v. Squire,l the plaintiff, an entryman on 320 acres 
under the Desert Land Entries Act (43 U.S.c. § 32), con-
1. 267 Cal. App.2d 461, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
154 (1968). 
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tracted with defendants to convey 178.46 of the acres in con-
sideration of development work that would enable plaintiff 
to complete the entry requirements. Such executory contracts 
prior to execution of the patent are illegal, and the illegality 
is not to be regarded as trivial. Defendants, however, had 
labored mightily and spent $90,000, and the work necessary 
for plaintiff's patent, and more, had been completed. Having 
obtained the patent, plaintiff sued to quiet title and defendant 
sought specific performance of the contract. The illegality 
was not called to the trial court's attention and it found for 
defendant. The reviewing Court reversed. While declining 
to grant specific performance of the illegal bargain (thereby 
depriving the defendant of the enhanced value of the land), 
it remanded for retrial on the issue of whether an equitable 
lien should be imposed against the land for the moneys ex-
pended in making the improvements (thereby precluding a 
large measure of unjust enrichment) plus taxes and insurance 
paid by the defendants.2 
2. This equitable result was based commented upon by the author in 
squarely on the case of Hainey v. Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
Narigon 247 Cal. App.2d 528, 55 Cal. 1967 at p. 314. 
Rptr. 638 (1966), which was favorably 
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